By Mark Emerson Willey
“…everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States…” ARMY BOARD, 1944.
President Roosevelt (FDR) provoked the attack, knew about it in advance and covered up his failure to warn the Hawaiian commanders. FDR needed the attack to sucker Hitler to declare war, since the public and Congress were overwhelmingly against entering the war in Europe. It was his backdoor to war.
FDR blinded the commanders at Pearl Harbor and set them up by –
- denying intelligence to Hawaii (HI)
- on Nov 27, misleading the commanders into thinking negotiations with Japan were continuing
- having false information sent to HI about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.
1904 – The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in undeclared war.
1932 – In The Grand Joint Army Navy Exercises the attacker, Admiral Yarnell, attacked with 152 planes a half-hour before dawn 40 miles NE of Kahuku Point and caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
1938 – Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
1940 – FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.
7 Oct 1940 – Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an 8 point memo on how to force Japan into war with US. Beginning the next day FDR began to put them into effect and all 8 were eventually accomplished.
11 November 1940 – 21 aged British planes destroyed the Italian fleet, including 3 battleships, at their homeport in the harbor of Taranto in Southern Italy by using technically innovative shallow-draft torpedoes.
11 February 1941 – FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into war. Navy Chief Stark objected: “I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested (more forces to Manila) and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6.” (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424)
March 1941 – FDR sold munitions and convoyed them to belligerents in Europe — both acts of war and both violations of international law — the Lend-Lease Act.
23 Jun 1941 – Advisor Harold Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union,
“There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia.”
FDR was pleased with Admiral Richmond Turner’s report read July 22:
“It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of Netherland East Indies. . . it seems certain she would also include military action against the Philippine Islands, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war.”
On July 24 FDR told the Volunteer Participation Committee,
“If we had cut off the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war.” ftp://ftp.purdue.edu/pub/Liberal-Arts/History/pha/pearl.harbor/misc/fdr_1.txt
The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in US cutting off their main supply of oil and forcing them into war with the US. Intelligence information was withheld from Hawaii from this point forward.
14 August – After the Atlantic Conference, Churchill noted the “astonishing depth of Roosevelt’s intense desire for war.” Churchill cabled his cabinet “(FDR) obviously was very determined that they should come in.”.
18 October – diary entry by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes: “For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan.”
Purple Code – the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher which used automatic telephone switches to separately and differently encipher each character sent. It was cracked by the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men).
J-19 was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This columnar code was cracked.
JN-25 – The Japanese Fleet’s Cryptographic System, a.k.a. 5 number code (Sample). http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/jn25b.gif JN stands for Japanese Navy, introduced 1 June 1939.
This was a very simple old-type code book system used by the American Army and Navy in 1898 and abandoned in 1917 because it was insecure. Version A has a dictionary of 5,600 numbers, words and phrases, each given as a five figure number. These were super-enciphered by addition to random numbers contained in a second code book.
The dictionary was only changed once before PH on Dec 1, 1940, to a slightly larger version B but the random book was changed every 3 to 6 months- last on Aug 1. The Japanese blundered away the code when they introduced JN25-B by continuing to use, for 2 months, random books that had been previously solved by the Allies. That was the equivalent of handing over the JN-25B codebook.
It was child’s play for the Navy group OP-20-G (738 men whose primary responsibility was Japanese naval codes) to reconstruct the exposed dictionary. We recovered the whole thing immediately – in 1994 the NSA published that JN-25B was completely cracked in December 1940. In January 1941 the US gave Britain two JN-25B code books with keys and techniques for deciphering. The entire Pearl Harbor scheme was laid out in this code.
The official US Navy statement on JN-25B is the NAVAL SECURITY
GROUP HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II prepared by Captain J. Holtwick in June 1971 who quotes Captain Safford, the chief of OP-20-G, on page 398:
“By 1 December 1941 we had the code solved to a readable extent.”
“From the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large numbers of their military and diplomatic telegrams.”(GRAND ALLIANCE p 598)
Safford reported that during 1941
“The Navy COMINT team did a thorough job on the Japanese Navy with no help from the Army.”(SRH-149) ” … many pattern messages could be read practically entire with as few as 1500 meanings.” (NSA).
In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581 intercepted by US between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA says
“We know now that they contained important details concerning the existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force.”
(Parker p 21) Of the over thousand radio messages sent by Tokyo to the attack fleet, only 20 are in the National Archives. All messages to the attack fleet were sent several times, at least one message was sent every odd hour of the day and each had a special serial number. Starting in early November 1941 when the attack fleet assembled and started receiving radio messages, OP-20-G stayed open 24 hours a day and the “First Team” of codebreakers worked on JN-25.
In November and early December 1941, OP-20-G spent 85 percent of its effort reading Japanese Navy traffic, 12 percent on Japanese diplomatic traffic and 3 percent on German naval codes. FDR was personally briefed twice a day on JN-25 traffic by his aide, Captain John Beardell, and demanded to see the original raw messages in English. The US Government refuses to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941 decrypts of JN-25 on the basis of national security, a half-century after the war.
AD or Administrative Code wrongly called Admiralty Code was an old four character transposition code used for personnel matters. No important messages were sent in this weak code. Introduced Nov 1938, it was seldom used after Dec 1940.
Magic the security designation given to all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages. It’s hard not to conclude with historians like Charles Bateson that:
“Magic standing alone points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable anybody could have failed to forecast the Japanese move.”http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html
The NSA reached the same conclusion in 1955.
Ultra – the security designation for military codes. No Pearl Harbor investigation discussed Ultra even though on June 7, 1942 the Chicago Tribune and six other newspapers betrayed the fact we were reading JN-25.
Warnings do no harm and might do inexpressible good 27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This information was sent to the State Department and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel at Hawaii.
31 March 1941 – A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was. The fleet was the only threat to Japan’s plans.
Logically, Japan couldn’t engage in any major operation with the American fleet on its flank. The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.
10 July – US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
July – The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named “Tricycle”, Dusko Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI told him that his information was
“too precise, too complete to be believed. The questionnaire plus the other information you brought spell out in detail exactly where, when, how, and by whom we are to be attacked. If anything, it sounds like a trap.”
He also reported that a senior Japanese naval person had gone to Taranto to collect all secret data on the attack there and that it was of utmost importance to them. The info was given to Naval IQ.
Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean People’s League, told Eric Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had positive proof that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among other things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October, Haan finally convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning to attack in December or January. Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and FDR personally.
24 September 1941, the ” bomb plot” message in J-19 code from Japan Naval Intelligence to Japan’ s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships in harbor, unless to attack them – it was a dead giveaway.
Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based on it prepared by Safford and others from being passed to Hawaii.
The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced because he insisted on warning HI.
It was lack of information like this that lead to the exoneration of the Hawaii commanders and the blaming of Washington for unpreparedness for the attack by the Army Board and Navy Court.
At no time did the Japanese ever ask for a similar bomb plot for any other American military installation.
Why the Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941 to allow it to continue.
The bomb plots were addressed to “Chief of 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff”, marked Secret Intelligence message, and given special serial numbers, so their significance couldn’t be missed. There were about 95 ships in port. The text was:
“Strictly secret.”Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:
“1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
“Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. “Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) “Area C. East Loch. “Area D. Middle Loch. “Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
“2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)”
Simple traffic analysis of the accelerated frequency of messages from various Japanese consuls gave another identification of war preparations. From Aug-Dec there were 6 messages from Seattle, 18 from Panama, 55 from Manila and 68 from Hawaii.
Oct. – Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the greatest spy in history, informed Kremlin that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this was passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in the War Department’s copy of Sorge’s 32,000 word confession to the Japanese were deleted. NY Daily News, 17 May 1951.
16 Oct. – FDR grossly humiliated Japan’s Ambassador and refused to meet with Premier Konoye to engineer the war party, lead by General Tojo, into power in Japan.
1 Nov. – JN-25 Order to continue drills against anchored capital ships to prepare to
“ambush and completely destroy the US enemy.”
The message included references to armor-piercing bombs and ‘near surface torpedoes.’
13 Nov. – The German Ambassador to US, Dr. Thomsen an anti-Nazi, told OSS that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.
14 Nov. – Japanese Merchant Marine was alerted that wartime recognition signals would be in effect Dec 1.
22 Nov. – Tokyo said to Ambassador Nomura in Washington about extending the deadline for negotiations to November 29:
“…this time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.”
CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US was warned in mid-November that the Japanese Fleet had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to attack Pearl Harbor. FOIA #F-1998-00977.
23 Nov. – JN25 order –
“The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-day.” (Tokyo time or 8 A.M. Honolulu time)
25 Nov. – British decrypted the Winds setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded it Nov. 28. It was a J-19 Code message that there would be an attack and that the signal would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report – ‘rain’ meaning ‘war’; ‘east’ (Higashi) meaning ‘US’.
25 Nov. – Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary:
“FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday.”
“the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors.”
25 Nov. – Navy Department ordered all US trans-Pacific shipping to take the southern route. PHH 12:317 ADM Turner testified:
“We sent the traffic down to the Torres Straight, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic.” PHH 4:1942
25 Nov. – Yamamoto gave this order in JN-25:
“(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The raid is planned for dawn on X-day — exact date to be given by later order. (b) Should the negotiations with the US prove successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble.(c) The task force will move out of Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4 December and speedily complete refueling.” (Order to sail – scan from the PHA Congressional Hearings Report, vol 1 p 180, transcript p 437-8) (Order to sale URL http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/sail.gif
This was decoded by the British on November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. When it was decoded by the US is a national secret, however, on November 26 Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.
26 Nov. 3 A.M. – Churchill sent an urgent secret message to FDR, probably containing above message. This message caused the greatest agitation in DC. Of Churchill’s voluminous correspondence with FDR, this is the only message that has not been released (on the grounds that it would damage national security). Stark testified that
“On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States.”
C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941, in his book THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7, wrote
“The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii.”
Washington, in an order of Nov 26, ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington out of Pearl Harbor “as soon as possible”. This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection.
In response to Churchill’s message, FDR secretly cabled him that afternoon –
“Negotiations off. Services expect action within two weeks.”
Note that the only way FDR could have linked negotiations with service action, let alone have known the timing of the action, was if he had the message to sail. In other words, the only service action contingent on negotiations was Pearl Harbor.
26 Nov. – the “most fateful document ” was Hull’s ultimatum that Japan must withdraw from Indochina and all China. FDR’s Ambassador to Japan called this
“The document that touched the button that started the war.”
27 Nov. – Secretary of War Stimson sent a confused and confusing hostile action possible or DO-DON’T warning. http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/warnings.html
The Navy Court found this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One purpose of the message was to mislead HI into believing negotiations were continuing.
The Army which could not do recon was ordered to, and the Navy which could was ordered not to.
The Army was ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically precluded attention to outside threat. Navy attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC repeated, no less than three times as a direct instruction of the President,
“The US desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Period.”
It was unusual that FDR directed this warning, a routine matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew other warnings were not sent.
A simple question — what Japanese “overt act” was FDR expecting at Pearl Harbor? He ordered sabotage prevented and subs couldn’t enter, that leaves air attack.
The words “overt act” disclose FDR’s intent — not just that Japan be allowed to attack but that they inflict damage on the fleet.
This FDR order to allow a Japanese attack was aid to the enemy — explicit treason.
29 Nov.- Hull sat in Layfayette Park across from the White House with ace United Press reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26 message from Churchill.
The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH report on page 13 under the headline “Attack Was Expected” stated the US had known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked the week before. Perhaps Leib wasn’t the only reporter Hull told.
29 Nov. – U.S. made a telephone intercept of an uncoded plain-text Japanese conversation in which an Embassy functionary (Kurusu) asked ‘Tell me, what zero hour is. Otherwise, I won’t be able to carry on diplomacy.’ The voice from Tokyo (K. Yamamoto) said softly, ‘Well then, I will tell you. Zero hour is December 8 (Tokyo time, ie, December 7 US time) at Pearl Harbor’.
30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec. Tokyo time) – The Japanese fleet was radioed this Imperial Naval Order (JN-25):
“JAPAN, UNDER THE NECESSITY OF HER SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE, HAS REACHED A POSITION TO DECLARE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.” ( Congress Appendix D, p 415).
US ally China also recovered it in plain text from a shot-down Japanese Army plane near Canton that evening. This caused an emergency Imperial Conference because they knew the Chinese would give the information to GB and US. In a related J-19 message the next day, the US translated elaborate instructions from Japan dealing in precise detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia “on the outbreak of war with England and the United States”
1 Dec. – Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the four wireless news services and several shipping companies that they were getting strange signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew the exact location of the Japanese fleet because they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of their ships pass (Layton p 261). This info was most likely given to them by US because Sorge’s spy ring was rolled up November 14. All long-range PBY patrols from the Aleutians were ordered stopped on Dec 6 to prevent contact.
1 Dec. – Foreign Minister Togo cabled Washington Ambassador Nomura to continue negotiations,
“to prevent the U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious.”
1 Dec. – The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the Striking Force in an order intercepted Nov 14, radioed:
“proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December.” (near HI)
The fact that this message is in the National Archives destroys the myth that the attack fleet maintained radio silence. They were not ordered to (Order 820). Serial numbers prove that the Striking Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16 and Dec 7 or about 1 per hour.
The NSA has not released any raw intercepts because the headers would prove that the Striking Force did not maintain radio silence.
On Nov 29 the Hiyei sent one message to the Commander of the 3rd fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi sent several messages to its tankers – see page 474 of the Hewitt Report. http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/warnings.html
Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209) found over 100 messages from the Striking Force in the National Archives. All Direction Finding reports from HI have been crudely cut out. Reports from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked up by Station Cast, P.I.
From traffic analysis, HI reported that the carrier force was at sea and in the North.
THE MOST AMAZING FACT is that in reply to that report, MacArthur’s command sent a series of three messages, Nov 26, 29, Dec 2, to HI lying about the location of the carrier fleet – saying it was in the South China Sea.
This false information, which the NSA calls inexplicable, was the true reason that HI was caught unawares. Duane Whitlock, who is still alive in Iowa, sent those messages. There were a large number of other messages that gave the location of the Striking Force by alluding to the Aleutians, the North Pacific and various weather systems near HI.
1 Dec. – FDR cut short his scheduled ten day vacation after 1 day to meet with Hull and Stark. The result of this meeting was reported on 2 Dec. by the Washington Post:
“President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and military moves relating to Japan.”
This politically damaging move was necessary to prevent the mutiny of conspirators.
1 Dec. 3:30 P.M. FDR read Foreign Minister Togo’s message to his ambassador to Germany:
“Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger between Japan & Anglo-Saxon nations through some clash of arms, add that the time of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.”
This was in response to extreme German pressure on November 29 for Japan to strike the US and promises to join with Japan in war against the US.
The second of its three parts has never been released. The message says it contains the plan of campaign. This is 1 of only 3 known DIPLOMATIC intercepts that specified PH as target. It was so interesting, FDR kept a copy.
[Note: The U.S. was already secretly at war with Germany, in violation of Geneva conventions. See Congressman Book’s comments, and correlating remarks in Hitler’s speech declaring war on U.S., Dec. 11th, 1941]
2 Dec. 2200 Tokyo time- Here is a typical JN-25 ships-in-harbor report sent to attack fleet, words in parenthesis were in the original:
“Striking Force telegram No. 994. Two battleships (Oklahoma, Nevada), 1 aircraft carrier (Enterprise), 2 heavy cruisers, 12 destroyers sailed. The force that sailed on 22 November returned to port. Ships at anchor Pearl Harbor p.m. 28 November were 6 battleships (2 Maryland class, 2 California class, 2 Pennsylvania class), 1 aircraft carrier (Lexington), 9 heavy cruisers (5 San Fransisco class, 3 Chicago class, 1 Salt Lake class), 5 light cruisers (4 Honolulu class, 1 Omaha class)”
2 Dec. – Commander of the Combined Imperial Fleet Yamamoto radioed the attack fleet in plain (uncoded),
“Japanese Climb Niitakayama 1208” (Dec 8 Japanese time, Dec 7 our time).
Thus the US knew EXACTLY when the war would start. Even HI knew. Mount Niitaka was the highest mountain in the Japanese Empire – 13,113 feet.
2 Dec. – General Hein Ter Poorten, the commander of the Netherlands East Indies Army gave the Winds setup message to the US War Department. The Dutch intercept station was Kamer 14 on Java.
The Dutch, British and Americans all had liaison officers at each others’ Far Eastern code centers and secret radio contact with each other (British FECB at Singapore; and US at Station Cast, Philippines) throughout 1941.
These centers helped each other. The Australians had a center in Melbourne and the Chinese also broke JN-25. A Dutch sub had visually tracked the attack fleet to the Kurile Islands in early November and this info was passed to DC, but DC did not give it to HI. The intercepts the Dutch gave the US are still classified in RG 38, Box 792.
2 Dec – Japanese order No. 902 specified that old JN-25 additive tables version 7 would continue to be used alongside version 8 when the latter was introduced on December 4th. This means the US read all messages to the Striking Force through the attack.
4 Dec. – In the early hours, Ralph Briggs at the Navy’s East Coast Intercept station, received the
“East Winds, Rain”
message, the ‘Winds Execute’, which meant war. He put it on the TWX circuit immediately and called his commander. This message was deleted from the files.
One of the main coverups of Pearl Harbor was to make this message disappear. Japanese Dispatch # 7001.
In response to the ‘Winds Execute’, the Office of US Naval IQ had all Far Eastern stations (Hawaii not informed) destroy their codes and classified documents including the Tokyo Embassy.
4 Dec. – Kilsoo Haan called Maxwell Hamilton at the State Department and told him that the Korean underground had information that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor the coming weekend.
4 Dec. – The Dutch invoked the ADB joint defense agreement when the Japanese crossed the magic line of 100 East and 10 North. The U.S. was at war with Japan 3 days before they were at war with us.
4 Dec. – General Ter Poorten sent all the details of the Winds Execute command to Colonel Weijerman, the Dutch military attache’ in Washington to pass on to the highest military circles. Weijerman personally gave it to Marshall, Chief of Staff of the War Department.
4 Dec – US General Thorpe at Java sent four messages warning of the PH attack. DC ordered him to stop sending warnings.
5 Dec. – All Japanese international shipping had returned to home port.
5 December – In the morning FDR dictated a letter to Wendell Wilkie for the Australian Prime Minister,
“There is always the Japanese to consider. The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment. . .Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matters.”
5 Dec. – At a Cabinet meeting, Secretary of the Navy Knox said,
“Well, you know Mr. President, we know where the Japanese fleet is?”
“Yes, I know. I think we ought to tell everybody just how ticklish the situation is. We have information as Knox just mentioned. . . Well, you tell them what it is, Frank.”
Knox became very excited and said,
“Well, we have very secret information that the Japanese fleet is out at sea. Our information is. . .”
and then a scowling FDR cut him off. (Infamy, Toland, 1982, ch 14 sec 5)
5 Dec. – Washington Star reporter Constantine Brown quotes a friend in his book The Coming of the Whirlwind p 291,
“This is it! The Japs are ready to attack. We’ve broken their code, and we’ve read their ORDERS.”
5 Dec. – Lt. Howard Brown of Station Cast in the Philippines received urgent request from Washington to listen for a short message from Tokyo which ended with the English word “stop”.
He heard the message at 11:30 PM Hawaiian time Dec 6. This is the hidden Word Code set up in a message of November 27 (e.g. in code, Roosevelt=Miss Kimiko). The message was:
“Relations between Japan and the following countries are on the brink of catastrophe: Britain and the United States.”
6 December – This 18 November 19 message was translated by the Army:
“1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my No.219 on that day. Area A — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. Area C – – 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in harbor. The carrier Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks ‘KS’. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D. 3. At 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor…”
Of course this information was not passed to HI.
6 Dec. – A Dec 2 request from Tokyo to HI for information about the absence of barrage balloons, anti-torpedo nets and air recon was translated by the Army.
6 Dec. – at 9:30 P.M FDR read the first 13 parts of the decoded Japanese diplomatic declaration of war and said
“This means war.”
What kind of President would do nothing? When he returned to his 34 dinner guests he said,
“The war starts tomorrow.”
6 Dec. – the war cabinet: FDR, top advisor Hopkins, Stimson, Marshall, Secretary of the Navy Knox, with aides John McCrea and Frank Beatty
“deliberately sat through the night of 6 December 1941 waiting for the Japs to strike.” (Infamy ch 16 sec 2)
7 December – A message from the Japanese Consul in Budapest to Tokyo:
“On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.”
The communique was the Dec 5th war alert from the British Admiralty. It has disappeared. This triple priority alert was delivered to FDR personally.
The Mid-East British Air Marshall told Col. Bonner Fellers on Saturday that he had received a secret signal that America was coming into the war in 24 hours.
Churchill summarized the message in GRAND ALLIANCE page 601 as listing the two fleets attacking British targets and
“Other Japanese fleets…also at sea on other tasks.”
There only were three other fleets — for Guam, the Philippines and HI.
Two paragraphs of the alert, British targets only, are printed in AT DAWN WE SLEPT, Prange, p 464. There is no innocent purpose for our government to hide this document.
7 December 1941 very early Washington time, there were two Marines, an emergency special detail, stationed outside the Japanese Naval Attache’s door.
9:30 AM Aides begged Stark to send a warning to Hawaii. He did not.
10 AM FDR read the 14th part.
11 A.M. FDR read the 15th part setting the time for the declaration of war to be delivered to the State Department at 1 PM, about dawn Pearl Harbor time, and did nothing.
Navy Secretary Knox was given the 15th part at 11:15 A.M. with this note from the Office of Naval IQ:
“This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today.”
Naval IQ also transmitted this prediction to Hull and about 8 others, including the White House (PHH 36:532).
At 10:30 AM Bratton informed Marshall that he had a most important message (the 15th part) and would bring it to Marshall’s quarters but Marshall said he would take it at his office.
At 11:25 Marshall reached his office according to Bratton. Marshall testified that he had been riding horses that morning but he was contradicted by Harrison, McCollum, and Deane. Marshall who had read the first 13 parts by 10 PM the prior night, perjured himself by denying that he had even received them. Marshall, in the face of his aides’ urgent supplications that he warn Hawaii, made strange delays including reading and re-reading all of the 10 minute long 14 Part Message (and some parts several times) which took an hour.
He refused to use the scrambler phone on his desk, refused to send a warning by the fast, more secure Navy system but sent Bratton three times to inquire how long it would take to send his watered down warning.
When informed it would take 30 or 40 minutes by Army radio, he was satisfied (that meant he had delayed enough so the warning wouldn’t reach Pearl Harbor until after the 1 PM Washington time deadline).
The warning was in fact sent commercial without priority identification and arrived 6 hours late. This message reached all other addressees, like the Philippines and Canal Zone, in a timely manner.
7 December – 7:55 A.M. Hawaii time
AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL.
7 December – 1:50 P.M. Washington time. Harry Hopkins, who was the only person with FDR when he received the news of the attack by telephone from Knox, wrote that FDR was unsurprised and expressed “great relief.”
Eleanor Roosevelt wrote about December 7th in This I Remember p 233, that FDR became “in a way more serene.”
In the NY Times Magazine of October 8, 1944 she wrote:
“Dec. 7 was…far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time.”
7 December – 3:00 PM
“The (war cabinet) conference met in not too tense an too tense an atmosphere because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was Hitler…and that Japanhad given us an opportunity.” Harry Hopkins, Dec. 7 Memo (Roosevelt and Hopkins R Sherwood, p. 431)
7 December – 9 hours later, MacArthur’s entire air force was caught by surprise and wiped out in the Philippines.
His reaction to the news of Pearl Harbor was quite unusual — he locked himself in his room all morning and refused to meet with his air commander General Brereton, and refused to attack Japanese forces on Formosa even under orders from the War Department.
MacArthur gave three conflicting orders that ensured the planes were on the ground most of the morning. MacArthur used radar tracking of the Japanese planes at 140, 100, 80, 60, down to 20 miles to time his final order and ensure his planes were on the ground.
Strategically, the destruction of half of all US heavy bombers in the world was more important than naval damage in Pearl Harbor. Either MacArthur had committed the greatest blunder in military history or he was under orders to allow his forces to be destroyed.
If it were the greatest blunder in history, it is remarkable how he escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star and Congressional Medal of Honor shortly later. Prange argued,
“How could the President ensure a successful Japanese attack unless he confided in the commanders and persuaded them to allow the enemy to proceed unhindered?”
7 December – 8:30 PM, FDR said to his cabinet,
“We have reason to believe that the Germans have told the Japanese that if Japan declares war, they will too. In other words, a declaration of war by Japan automatically brings…”
at which point he was interrupted, but his expectation and focus is clear. Mrs. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, observed later about FDR:
“I had a deep emotional feeling that something was wrong, that this situation was not all it appeared to be.”
Mrs. Perkins was obsessed by Roosevelt’s strange reactions that night and remarked particularly on the expression he had:
“In other words, there have been times when I associated that expression with a kind of evasiveness.”
FDR met with CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow at midnight. Murrow, who had seen many statesmen in crises, was surprised at FDR’s calm reaction. After chatting about London, they reviewed the latest news from PH and then FDR tested Murrow’s news instincts with these two bizarre giveaway questions:
“Did this surprise you?”
Murrow said yes. FDR:
“Maybe you think it didn’t surprise us?”
FDR gave the impression that the attack itself was not unwelcome.
This is the same high-strung FDR that got polio when convicted of perjury; the same FDR that was bedridden for a month when he learned Russia was to be attacked; the same FDR who couldn’t eat or drink when he got the Japanese order to sail.
8 December – In a conversation with his speechwriter Rosenman, FDR
“emphasized that Hitler was still the first target, but he feared that a great many Americans would insist that we make the war in the Pacific at least equally important with the war against Hitler.”
Later, Jonathan Daniels, administrative assistant and press secretary to FDR said,
“The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be…But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth the price…”
FDR reminisced with Stalin at Tehran on November 30, 1943, saying,
“if the Japanese had not attacked the US he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any American forces to Europe.”
Compare this statement with what FDR said at the Atlantic Conference four months before Pearl:
“Everything was to be done to force an ‘incident’ to justify hostitlities.”
Given that a Japanese attack was the only possible incident, then FDR had said he would do it.
Information Known in Washington and Hawaii October 9-December 7, 1941:
Date Item Washington Kimmel Short Oct. 9 “Bombplot” message X Nov. 26-28 “Winds” setup message X X  Nov. 26 Location of carriers X Dec. 1 Japanese declaration of war X Dec. 2-6 Code destruction X  X X Dec. 4 “Winds execute” message X X Dec. 4 US at war with Japan via ADB X Dec. 5 British Admiralty Alert X Dec. 6-7 “14 Part” message X Dec. 7 “One o’clock” message X  Admiral Kimmel learned of the “winds” code in a Nov. 28th dispatch to him from the US Asiatic Fleet. JCC, p. 470.  DC informed HI that codes were being burned world-wide so when they learned the local consulate burned codes they would not go on alert.
 General Short was given the Winds Execute by British IQ.
Note that none of the 3 diplomatic messages or the many naval messages identifying Pearl as the target were forwarded (not to mention HUMINT). Only 5 of the 74 Navy IQ packets delivered to FDR in the 2 weeks before Dec 7 can be found.
COMMISSIONS AND COVERUP
The issue of whether FDR and Washington were responsible for Pearl Harbor was decided in two courts of law in 1944. Both the Navy Court and the Army Board found Washington guilty.
NAVY Court of Inquiry !!! ftp://ftp.purdue.edu/pub/Liberal-Arts/History/pha/pearl.harbor/navy.court/ Top Secret ARMY Board Report!!!
“Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War, and Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. ”
In response to this report, Marshall offered his resignation – the sign of a guilty conscience. Marshall testified at the MacArthur hearings that he considered loyalty to his chief superior to loyalty to his country.
JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ftp://ftp.purdue.edu/pub/Liberal-Arts/History/pha/pearl.harbor/misc/army_1.txt on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Nov 15, 1945 to May 31, 1946, proved that there had been so much reversion of testimony, coverup and outright lies that the truth would have to wait until all Pearl Harbor records were declassified.
Most of the conspirators were military men, all men of FDR’s own choice, men who only followed orders and FDR never delegated authority.
Stark, in answer to charges that he denied IQ to Hawaii, said publicly in August 1945 that everything he did pre-Dec 7, 1941 was on FDR’s orders.
The handfull of military men in DC responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor were directly under the control of FDR and were later promoted and protected from investigation; promoted with FDR’s full knowledge that they were responsible for not warning Hawaii.
On the record, Intelligence tried to warn HI scores of times but were prevented by FDR’s men.
STATISTICS – ROOSEVELT WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING:
American Deaths: 2,403; Wounded 1,178.
Eighteen ships were sunk or seriously damaged including 5 battleships (USS Arizona photo). 188 planes were destroyed and 162 were damaged.
Japanese — Out of an attack force of 31 ships and 353 raiding planes the Japanese lost: 64 deaths, 29 planes, 5 midget submarines.
CONCLUSION – ROOSEVELT WAS A TRAITOR
The US was warned by, at least, the governments of Britain, Netherlands, Australia, Peru, Korea and the Soviet Union that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was coming.
Most, if not all, Japanese codes were broken.
FDR and Marshall and others knew the attack was coming, allowed it and covered up their knowledge.
It’s significant that both the the chief of OP-20-G Safford, and Friedman of Army SIS — the two people in the world that knew what we decoded — said that FDR knew Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked.
Pearl Harbor was not about war with Japan. Pearl Harbor was about war with GERMANY. HITLER WOULD NOT DECLARE WAR IF U.S. UNBEATABLE
- OBJECTIVE: War with Germany. How do you bait Hitler to declare war on you? You don’t get it by looking unbeatable!
- Direct provocation in Atlantic had failed – Hitler didn’t bite.
- FDR knew from magic that if Japan attacked, Germany would declare war.
- Therefore: the problem was how to maneuver Japan into firing the first shot or make the first overt act.
- Japan must succeed or Hitler would renege. War with Japan was a given because they had to attack the Philippines. If Japan’s fleet were destroyed, it would defeat the purpose. It would have been obvious suicide for Hitler to declare war if Japan were crippled – it would allow the US to attack him without even the possibility of a two-front war.
That was what he had just been avoiding for months. The plan could only work if Japan’s attack succeeded. The lure of a weakened US in a two-front war focused on Japan seemed to make a German war declaration cost-free.
But it was all a trap – FDR was always going to ignore Japan and go after Hitler, for his ultimate goal was to save his beloved Soviet Communism.
[Note: See the out-of-print book, From Major Jordan’s Diaries, to discover the lengths to which FDR went to ‘save his beloved Soviet Communism’.]
In November FDR ordered the Red Cross Disaster Relief director to secretly prepare for massive casualties at Pearl Harbor because he was going to let it be attacked. When the director protested to the President, President Roosevelt told him that
“the American people would never agree to enter the war in Europe unless they were attack [sic] within their own borders.”
See U.S. Naval Institute – Naval History – Advance Warning? The Red Cross Connection by Daryl S. Borgquist http://www.usni.org/Naval_History/Articles99/NHborgquist.htm
CHURCHILL: FDR KNEW.
Did FDR know that Pearl Harbor was a Japanese target? Answer: FDR planned Pearl Harbor to be their target. He ordered the ships in and the carriers out. Churchill wrote about Pearl Harbor that FDR and his top advisors
“knew the full and immediate purpose of their enemy.” (GRAND ALLIANCE p 603)
Churchill’s entire discussion of Pearl Harbor was a justification of treason, e.g.:
“A Japanese attack upon the U.S. was a vast simplification of (FDR’s and advisors’) problems and their duty. How can we wonder that they regarded the actual form of the attack, or even its scale, as incomparably less important than the fact that the whole American nation would be united…?”
- Edgar Hoover told his friends in early 1942 that FDR had known about the Pearl Harbor plan since the early fall. It was totally in character for FDR to concoct such a plan. Not only had the US Senate already censured FDR for utterly lacking moral perspective, but as Walter Lippmann wrote:
“his purposes are not simple and his methods are not direct.”
To get into the war, FDR used the Atlantic Fleet as bait to be shot up; Pearl Harbor was the same thing in the Pacific. US Admiral Bloch testified
“The Japanese only destroyed a lot of old hardware. In a sense they did us a favor.”
This was obviously FDR’s view as well, because on 7 December at 2:15, minutes after hearing of the attack and before any damage reports were in, FDR called Lord Halifax at the British Embassy and told him
“Most of the fleet was at sea. . . none of their newer ships were in harbour.”
COVERUP BY SECRECY.
Why does the government refuse to release all the messages to the attack fleet, or any JN-25 messages decoded before Dec 7?
There is absolutely nothing about national security to hide in JN-25. It is a trivial and worthless 19th century code. The techniques for cracking it had been published world-wide in 1931.
The US government has proudly showed how they used JN-25 decrypts after December 8 to win the Battle of Midway which occurred 7 months after Pearl Harbor. Therefore, there is nothing intrinsic about the code itself, the means of cracking it, or the fact that we cracked it, that has any national security implications of any nature.
What is the difference between decrypts from the Purple machine and decrypts from JN- 25? The answer is simply that the JN-25 messages contained the final operational details of the Pearl Harbor attack, whereas the Purple did not.
WHAT ARE THEY HIDING?
Why won’t they let the truth out? Such secrecy breeds mistrust in government. The only thing that is left to hide are JN-25 decrypts and worksheets showing that the US and Britain monitored the Japanese attack fleet all the way to Pearl Harbor.
That is the scandal. That is the big secret. It raises the issue of whether the NSA is accessory after the fact to treason.
However, the secrecy and misdirection by the NSA about our capabilities with JN-25B and pre-war messages proves there is something very wrong. The NSA has systematically lied about the size of the JN25 books by a factor of four and about how many codebreakers worked on the code in 1941 by a factor of twenty-two.
The NSA is an evil Gestapo that is committed neither to truth nor open government nor the rule of law. We live an Orwellian history in which treason is honored, in which FDR’s murder of thousands of young innocent men is good. In a word, we are no different from the tyranny we decry. A self-governing people must have truth to make proper decisions. By subverting the truth, the National Security Agency is subverting our Democracy.
[Note: Under the Constitution, America is a Republican form of government. America is a Republic, as in: “. . . and to the Republic, for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all”. jackie]
He who controls the past, controls the future. He who controls the present, controls the past. – Orwell
Tokyo had to send the daily bomb-plots, cabled from its Honolulu consulate, to the attack fleet by JN-25 radio messages. The pilots had to get their target information.
“The news of the position of enemy ships in Pearl Harbor comes again and again.” – Lt. Cmdr. Chigusa, executive officer of the attack fleet’s Akigumo in his diary, December 4, 1941 (At Dawn We Slept, G. Prange, page 453).
FDR got it, too. FDR knew the Japanese pilots’ targets as well as they did, because he got their bomb-plots when they did. He had their specific targets, ship by ship, in his hands at the White House. These messages would prove absolutely that FDR knew that the attack fleet’s target was Pearl Harbor and therefore are not released.
The unnecessary and illogical secrecy about pre-December 7, 1941, JN-25 decoding is conclusive evidence that there was wrongdoing at the highest levels.
FDR was a traitor for maneuvering Japan into war with US — and that is known and admitted.
FDR was a traitor for sacrificing American lives, for putting America in danger, for usurping the Constitutional power of Congress to make war.
Day of infamy, indeed; he chose his words precisely with a hidden double-meaning. Four days before the attack, FDR could have sent telegrams of condolence to the families of the sailors he was going to allow to be killed.
Even today there is a coverup, based on a transparently bogus excuse of national security, that shows that our government cannot face the truth about what happened a half-century ago.
Truth we owe the men of Pearl Harbor.
Until we tell the full truth, we dishonor them and every soldier and sailor who gave their life for their country. Should their lives have been sacrificed for treason and no one know, they had died in vain? If their honor cover treason – we are not a nation of law.
The Air Corps in the Philippines and the Navy at Pearl were FDR’s bait, the oil embargo was his stick, the end of negotiations was the tripwire in FDR’s game of shame – a game of death for so many.
Roosevelt aided and abetted the murder of thousands of Americans.